Most estimates of the welfare costs of in ‡ation are devised considering only noninterestbearing assets, ignoring that since the 80's technological innovations and new regulations have increased the liquidity of interest-bearing deposits. We investigate the resulting bias. Su¢ cient and necessary conditions on its sign are presented, along with closed-form expressions for its magnitude. Two examples dealing with bidimensional bilogarithmic money demands show that disregarding interest-bearing monies may lead to a non-negligible overestimation of the welfare costs of in ‡ation. An intuitive explanation is that such assets may partially make up for the decreased demand of noninterest-bearing assets due to higher in ‡ation.
interest-bearing monies. 2 This paper investigates the bias in the welfare calculations arising from this fact. Put in another way, we investigate the error arising from using unidimensional, rather than bidimensional (or multidimensional, since the extension to n di¤erent interest-bearing monies is straightforward) measures of the welfare costs of in ‡ation. 3 Monetary aggregates are here classi…ed and aggregated solely according to their user costs. Let m and x stand for the real quantities of M 1 and M 2 n M 1 , respectively. 4 The aggregation of all interest-bearing deposits in one single asset x, as is done here, implicitly assumes that they all have approximately the same user cost (de…ned as their opportunity cost relative to holding bonds). Otherwise, additional dimensions may be used, an extension that requires no signi…cant cost. The present analysis concerns using only m in the calculations of the welfare costs of in ‡ation, vis-à-vis using an aggregation of m and x.
We argue that the latter should become the standard procedure.
We assume that all monies are costlessly issued by the government. When it comes to the closed-form solutions for the bias arising from disregarding interest-bearing deposits, could be extended to the more general case in which this fact is not taken for granted, using for example the multidimensional formulas in Cysne and Turchick (2007) .
To make our point clear right from the outset, let R stand for the interest rate on bank deposits, and R B for the interest rate on a non-monetary …nancial asset. Since bank deposits provide monetary services, we must have R B > R 0. Bailey's unidimensional 2 Lucas (2000) acknowledges this point in the concluding section of his work. 3 Cysne and Turchick (2007) provide an upper bound to another type of error: the one arising from using one of the di¤erent types of multidimensional measures available in the literature, vis-à-vis the others. 4 Output is taken to be equal to 1, so that m and x may also represent fractions of GDP.
welfare formula B U , which reads 5 B U (R B ) =
has been widely employed in the literature in the past …fty years, a recent contribution being that of Ireland (2009) .
We shall see that even when the opportunity cost of holding bank deposits (R B R) is constant, welfare formulas for households holding both bank deposits and bonds (in addition to currency) should also take into account the e¤ect of variations of the interest rate paid by bonds on the demand for bank deposits (x 0 (R B )). The use of equation (1) should therefore lead to a bias, the sign of which depends on the sign of x 0 ; i.e., whether currency and deposits are substitutes or complements.
In the remainder of this text we will proceed as follows. Section 2 shortly presents multidimensional measures of the welfare costs of in ‡ation based, respectively, on the McCallum-Goodfriend (1987) shopping-time dynamic framework and the Sidrauski (1967) money-in-the-utility-function (MUF) framework. They are developed for households holding currency, bank deposits and bonds. The main purpose here is to show why a second integral (besides the one in Bailey's unidimensional formula) has to be considered in the calculations of the welfare costs of in ‡ation.
Section 3 concentrates on the sign of the bias arising from the use of unidimensional measures instead of formulas which also take into consideration the existence of interest-bearing deposits. The comparison could be based on the multidimensional formulas arising from the use of the McCallum-Goodfriend or of the Sidrauski model. To simplify, we de…ne the bias and proceed with the calculations using an approximation to both of these formulas. For analogy reasons, we shall call this approximation formula "Bailey's multidimensional formula for the welfare costs of in ‡ation", B M . Next, we 5 The subscript "U " used here stands for unidimensional. 
The shopping-time approach
In this section we shall not consider growth (it makes no di¤erence concerning our …nal results). Let y stand for real output and normalize it to 1. The consumer has a (…xed) time endowment equal to unity and gains utility from real consumption (c = C=P , P standing for the price index) of a single non-storable consumption good, with preferences determined by
where U is a strictly increasing and concave function and g > 0.
Consumers can accumulate three assets: currency (M ), interest-bearing deposits (X) and bonds (B). The interest rates paid by each one of these assets are, respectively, zero, R and R B . Let b = B=P , m = M=P , x = X=P , h = H=P (H indicates the (exogenous) ‡ow of money transferred by the government to such consumers). Let s stand for shopping time and = _ P =P for the in ‡ation rate (the dot over the variable represents its time derivative). Then, the budget constraint reads:
The transacting technology is given by
with F m > 0, F x > 0 and F s > 0. The twice-di¤erentiable monetary-aggregator function G is assumed to be …rst-degree homogeneous, concave and such that G mm < 0, G xx < 0. The microfoundations for a transacting technology of type (4) are based on the inventory technology found in the works of Baumol (1952) , Tobin (1956) and Miller and Orr (1966) .
Lucas (2000, p. 265 -see, in particular, ft. 13) discusses this point.
Households maximize (2) subject to the budget constraint (3) and to the time-transacting technology (4). In the steady state, assuming interior solutions, Euler equations lead to the necessary conditions 8 > > > > < > > > > :
The equilibrium in the goods market is described by 1 s = F (m; x; s).
When the functions G and are known, the three last equations can be used to determine m(R B ; R B R), x(R B ; R B R) and s(R B ; R B R).
As shown in Cysne (2003) , in this model the welfare costs of in ‡ation are given by the di¤erential form of a Divisia index:
with s(0; 0) = 0. In this 2-dimensional context, a reasonable approximation to (5) for low values of R B can be given by the Bailey-like multidimensional di¤erential formula
with B M (0; 0) = 0. also go to 0, we get ds dB M and, upon integration and usage of the initial conditions, s(R B ; R B R) B M (R B ; R B R). 7 As an example, if currency demand takes the conventional log-log form with respect to R B , the assumption lim R B !0 R B m = 0 amounts to the condition that this demand be inelastic with respect to its opportunity cost (and similar reasoning applies to lim R B R!0 (R B R) x = 0).
The MUF approach
The purpose of this subsection is to establish the robustness of the results derived in the previous one concerning the general form of the expressions which should be used for 6 As a counterpart to the subscript "U " used in (1), the subscript "M " used here stands for "multidimensional". 7 Here "f g" means asymptotic equivalence, that is, f =g ! 1 in the limiting process considered. Lucas (2000) shows in the unidimensional case that, in practice, the di¤erence between B U and s is negligible.
welfare calculations in economies with more than one type of monetary asset. We show that the use of an alternative setting (Sidrauski's money-in-the-utility-function setting, rather than the shopping-time one) leads to welfare expressions similar to (5) and (6), but now extending the unidimensional measure given in Lucas (2000, section 3).
We incorporate growth in the model by normalizing y 0 to 1 and making (as in Lucas 2000)
with > 0. 
+1] is as in the previous subsection. Given (7) , consumers maximize
Euler equations for this problem give 8 > < > :
The points d 2 D are those corresponding to the maximum available value for '. Call 
Note that (11) gives the opportunity cost of holding each asset as a function of m and
It is a di¤erentiable function, given the twice-di¤erentiability of '.
Write down the equations de…ning Lucas's measure of the welfare cost of in ‡ation using the de…nition of ' :
Totally di¤erentiating this expression gives
or, using (11) together with G's homogeneity,
(12) is the di¤erential form of the Divisia index which gives the welfare costs of in ‡ation for this economy. Obviously, as (m; x) approaches D, w(m; x) ! 0, and
Therefore, from (11) and (6), dw dB M and w B M , as shown for s in the previous subsection. In words (and again, as shown concerning the unidimensional case in Lucas 2000), as w gets closer and closer to zero, the welfare measure which emerges from the multidimensional money-in-the-utility-function approach leads to (6), the generalization of Bailey's formula to a multidimensional setting.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this section is that when either the shopping-time or the Sidrauski setting is considered, (5) or (12) are the correct welfare measures to be used for households holding currency, bank deposits and bonds, rather than (1) . And that, when reasonable interest rates are considered, (6) can be used as a good approximation to both. From the previous section we conclude that, in economies with currency, interest-bearing deposits and bonds, at least three alternative formulas can be used to calculate the welfare costs of in ‡ation: (5), (6) Indeed, by assuming R B R = K constant in the previous multidimensional formulas, and taking into consideration that R B K (since R 0), one obtains the following particular cases:
when the shopping-time model is taken as reference;
when a multidimensional Bailey-like approximation is taken as reference; and
when a money-in-the-utility-function approach is taken as reference. 9 For notational ease only, we write m 0 ( ) and x 0 ( ) for (@m=@R B ) ; K and (@x=@R B ) ; K , respectively.
There are three conceptual di¤erences between (1) and any one of formulas (13), (14) and (15) .
First, since R 0, the dummy variable in the formulas above should run from K to R B , rather than from 0 to R B . Note, though, that K can be equal to zero.
Second, one has to take into consideration the e¤ects of changes in R B on the demand for bank deposits (x).
Third, and in general as well, all functions should be written as depending both on R B
and R B R, rather than on one variable only.
Note that (13), (14) and (15) can be split into two Riemann integrals, the second one based on x 0 ( ) (evaluated for a …xed value of R B R equal to K), whereas (1) cannot.
Since (13), (14) and (15) are asymptotically equivalent (for small interest rates or large amounts of monies demanded; and under the assumptions at the end of Section 2.1), a comparison between (1) and any one of these three measures also conveys relevant information about the di¤erence between (1) and the other two. For simplicity, we shall in the remainder of this section compare (1) with its multidimensional extension (14) (accordingly, the bias will be de…ned in the next section as the absolute value of the relative di¤erence between these two formulas).
(14) will lead to welfare …gures less than or greater than (1), depending if x 0 ( ), the cross derivative of the demand for interest-bearing deposits with respect to the opportunity cost of holding currency, is, respectively, positive or negative. In the former case, currency and interest-bearing deposits are said to be substitutes; in the latter case, to be complementary to each other. It is therefore important to study the sign of x 0 ( ) which may emerge from the shopping-time or the MUF model. Totally di¤erentiating the equilibrium equations (11) yields:
and the functions G, ', ' 0 , ' 00 are calculated at the equilibrium.
Inversion of this system gives:
, implying the equilibrium derivatives
This can be rewritten as (see Appendix A for details)
and
From the subgradient inequality applied to the concave function ', we know that
This explains the negativity of m 0 on the one hand, but the sign-indeterminacy of x 0 on the other.
Results under general G and ' functions
We now look for a su¢ cient condition regarding functions G and ' so that B U > B M , irrespective of interest rates. By comparing (1) and (14), one easily concludes that a su¢ cient condition for B U > B M is that currency and interest-bearing deposits are substitutes to each other (x 0 > 0). 10 Indeed, for any R B , we have
Therefore,
This leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Consider an economy with currency, interest-bearing bank deposits and
bonds, where the spread on bank deposits can be considered constant. Then a su¢ cient condition for Bailey's unidimensional measure of the welfare costs of in ‡ation to overestimate (underestimate) the true welfare costs of in ‡ation is that the following expression is negative (positive):
where G, G m , G x and G mx are evaluated at each pair (m; x) 2 [0; +1] 2 , and ', ' 0 and ' 00 are evaluated at G (m; x).
Proof. This comes directly from (18) and (19) .
The condition given in the above proposition, which makes x 0 (R B ) > 0, can also be written in terms of elasticities in the following way. Let "
and "
be the elasticities of, 10 Following the explanation above, in this economy an adaptation in Bailey's formula (1) must take place:
the lower limit of integration is now K.
respectively, cash and bank-deposits demands, with respect to the nominal interest rate paid by government bonds. Let represent the elasticity of substitution between cash and bank deposits, all three elasticities being evaluated at the same point. That is,
.
Since R B R is constant, we have
Therefore, "
> 0 if, and only if, + "
< 0, by (17) ). This leads to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Consider an economy with currency, interest-bearing bank deposits and bonds, where the spread on bank deposits can be considered constant. Then Bailey's unidimensional measure of the welfare costs of in ‡ation overestimates the true welfare costs when the elasticity of demand for currency is (in absolute value) always lower than the elasticity of substitution between currency and bank deposits:
Conversely, an underestimation occurs when the elasticity of demand for currency is (in absolute value) always greater than that elasticity of substitution:
Remark 1 (The Cobb-Douglas case, = 1.) Note that " 
Results under a CES G function and a general ' function
Note that condition (20) establishes a property which depends on both functions G and '.
In order to get further results and insights, this subsection still assumes a general ', but particularizes to the case in which the aggregator function G has a constant elasticity of substitution :
, where
Proposition 3 gives a su¢ cient condition for overestimation related to ' only, provided the elasticity of substitution between m and x is high enough.
Proposition 3
Consider an economy with currency, interest-bearing bank deposits and bonds, where the spread on bank deposits can be considered constant, and Assumption G is valid. Then, a su¢ cient condition for Bailey's unidimensional measure of the welfare costs of in ‡ation to overestimate (underestimate) the true welfare costs is that, 8G 2 0; M , the 11 For example, the second expression from the bottom on page 251.
following expression is positive (negative):
where ', ' 0 and ' 00 are evaluated at G.
Proof. Using the expressions obtained in Appendix B for the partial derivatives of G, one has
Proposition 1 …nishes the job.
Remark 2
The sign of the expression in (24) coincides with that of 
In particular, if = 1, Remark 2 gives (G' 0 =') 0 = 0, whence ' is such that ' (G) = G , for some > 0 and 2 (0; 1). Given (11), this leads to 8 > < > :
Results under a CES G function and a CES ' function
For de…niteness, we impose, besides Assumption G, a functional form on ' implying the general CES-type expression for the utility function:
That is,
, where 2 (0; 1) and > 0.
Here M = +1, and properties ' 0 > 0 and ' 00 < 0 are straightforward. We then obtain the following very simple test: 
Gauging the bias
The last section presented a simple reason why unidimensional calculations of the welfare costs of in ‡ation may be biased. We now shift our concern from the direction of the bias to its size. That is, we are interested in assessing the measure
the error one incurs when taking B U instead of B M . The second equal sign is derived from (19) . Evidently, in the extreme K = 0 case, in which bonds and deposits are perfect substitutes, (1) and (14) would yield B M (R B ) = B U (R B ), so that = 0. From now on, K > 0 is assumed. Assumptions G and ' are also supposed to hold. For the reader's sake, auxiliary expressions relative to the 6 = 1 case are left to the appendices.
As shown in Appendix C, given Assumptions G and ', the demand system (11) in the = 1 case becomes, after inversion (regardless of whether is equal to unity or not),
(1 ) (R B R)
the bidimensional log-log money-demand speci…cation.
Putting R B R = K, we get m and x as functions of R B only. Formula (1) (with the lower limit of the integral adjusted to K as before) gives (see Appendix D)
From (14), we have
Therefore, we get and 6 = 1
Proof. It's just a matter of noting that the amount K x (R B ) x K was conveniently left in explicit form in the calculation of B M above (as well as in Appendix D), and then applying the second expression for in (25) .
It may be noted that, in any of the four cases presented in Proposition 6, neither nor (the parameters associated with the share of importance the individual gives to consumption of the good vis-à-vis the money aggregate) have any e¤ect on this bias.
Obviously, the absolute-value bars may be dispensed with when B U > B M . From Proposition 2, we know this will be the case when " 
Thus R if and only if R "
, whence Proposition 2 provides another proof for Proposition 5.
The two examples ahead illustrate the two main possibilities, overestimation and underestimation, of the welfare cost of in ‡ation, when interest-bearing deposits are not taken into account 13 . For simplicity, they use the Cobb-Douglas G case ( = 1), where neither R B nor K a¤ect the bias. For K, we use the value 0:0242. That is, while for yearly interest rates of 10%, B U is at 1:6% of GDP, the measure B M leads to just 0:53% of GDP, a threefold di¤erence. 13 Although, from a theoretical point of view, the partition we propose here is between M 1 and M 2nM 1 ; from this point on, when using monetary data (all of it related to the U.S. economy), we will not distinguish between M and M : This is to say that we will associate m with the available de…nition of M 1 (disregarding the possible existence of interest-bearing deposits in it, such as the NOW accounts) and x with M 2 n M 1, both as fractions of the U.S. GDP (M 1 was entirely noninterest-bearing only before 1980). We do that for practical reasons only.
14 Considering the 6 1/2 year-period from 01/2003 to 06/2009, the yearly average interest rate on the ten-year constant-maturity Treasury Bill was 4:23%, whereas that on M 2 n M 1 was approximately 1:53%.
The relative share of M 2nM 1 in M 2 was around 0:81. The average spread and the unconditional standard deviation (both calculated using monthly data) were 2:42% and 0:70%, respectively (data available from the Although our purpose here is more focused at providing an illustration of the application of our theoretical results than empirical estimates of the bias, a word of comparison with previous investigations of this same issue may be valuable. Bali (2000) concludes, akin to the numbers above, that assuming M 1 is noninterest bearing leads to an overestimate of the welfare cost by a factor of three. Bali's result, though, is not comparable with ours, for he assumes a utility function separable in currency and deposits, equivalent to making ! +1.
The overestimation obtained by Bali is a consequence of assuming that the user cost of interest-bearing deposits is proportional to the nominal interest rate (determined by a competitive banking system operating under constant reserve requirements). Under such an assumption it is easy to show that the welfare costs are proportional to the real value of the monetary aggregate used in the calculations. 16 Since the historical ratio of M 1 to the 16 See Proposition 4 in Cysne (2003).
monetary base is equal to three, an overestimation by a factor of three emerges.
We present below an example where the use of Bailey's welfare formula leads to an underestimation, rather than an overestimation, of the true welfare costs of in ‡ation (B U < B M ). As noted in Remark 1, because it implies (when G is Cobb-Douglas) an elasticity of demand for currency greater than one, this case can be considered to be less likely to hold in the real world. . Propositions 5 and 6 imply that, in this case, B U would underestimate the welfare cost of in ‡ation in = j(1 2) (1 0:5) =2j = 25%. That is, while for yearly interest rates of 10%, B U is at 1:6% of GDP, the measure B M leads to 2:13% of GDP. Although it is not our purpose here to make a sensitivity analysis regarding , it is clear from Figure 3 that the bias is usually of a relevant magnitude. Consider, for instance, a 10% yearly interest rate. Then taking = 0:02 leads to a B U about 28% lower than B M , whereas with = 2 B U turns out to be about 585% higher than B M .
Conclusions
Several papers in the literature on the welfare costs of in ‡ation use the one-dimensional formulas provided by Bailey (1956) Underestimation may also occur, but only if the interest-rate elasticity of M 1 is, in absolute value, su¢ ciently high (as stipulated by Proposition 2). For instance, in the Cobb-Douglas G case, leading to the bilogarithmic money demand (26) , it would have to be greater than one, an assumption usually not supported by empirical evaluations. The intuition for the overestimation implied by the use of unidimensional formulas is clear: such measures capture the welfare costs caused by in ‡ation due to a decrease in the equilibrium money demand. However, they ignore the fact that the existence of interest-bearing monetary assets in the economy may partially o¤set the drop in the real equilibrium value of M 1, by these means leading to welfare costs that may be lower than those calculated by such formulas. 
From G m 's and G x 's 0-homogeneity, Euler's relation for homogeneous functions gives 8 > < > :
so that G mx = mG mm =x and G mx = xG xx =m, and
GG mx =m, where the last equality comes again from Euler's relation. Similarly,
, where once again Euler's relation is used in the last step.
which, together with (16), gives (17) and (18) .
Appendix B
We here calculate the partial derivatives of G under Assumption G. Regardless of whether is 1 (Cobb-Douglas case) or not, one has:
and, analogously, G x = (1 ) (G=x)
So one can continue with the calculations from this point on as if it were a single case:
Appendix C
Our objective here is to show how the money-demand speci…cation (26) arises from (11), Assumptions G and ', as well as evaluating expression (24) under these assumptions.
From 
1 (
which can be inverted (…rst in the more general 6 = 1 case) by noting that , readily implying (26) .
We also have, from the expression above for ' 0 (G), which coincides with (29) .
Appendix D
Here we calculate the welfare cost measures B U and B M . We are still under Assumptions G and '.
Case = 1 and = 1:
B M is shown in (27) .
Case = 1 and 6 = 1: 
(1 )
R B
K
. Again, B M is shown in (27) . 
